Frequently Asked Questions About Biodefense: What you need to know about biodefense.

Mistakes Happen: A list of accidents and security breaches at biocontainment facilities, available on the web and as a poster-sized .pdf

 

Testimony Supporting House Bill 1397
Peter Shorett
Sheldon Krimsky

Sequences of Events:
BU Lab Overview
Tularemia Outbreak


Background
In September of 2003, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) awarded a $1.6 billion federal biodefense laboratory to Boston University Medical Center (BU). The project will include lab space designated for research on pathogens for which there is no known cure. While supporters applaud the potential for new jobs and vaccines, community groups have opposed the project.

Among their chief complaints is BU's aversion to transparency and accountability. Unlike other applicants for the lab, Boston University did not provide outlines of proposed research to community members. They circumvented the the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act (MEPA) by not completing an environmental impact review. The location of the lab was chosen without consulting surrounding communities. Furthermore, conditions stipulated by NIAID - and only reluctantly acknowledged by the university - make it possible that BU will not control the content of research conducted at the lab. Boston University's unwillingness to share details about a facility that will handle some of the most dangerous pathogens known to science, and their reluctance to openly engage the public, have created a climate of suspicion and distrust.

Four steps must be taken to ensure the safety of this laboratory. First, residents should have access to the proposal describing the facility; the types of research to be undertaken; and whether such research falls under Department of Homeland Security secrecy guidelines, which would provide dangerous immunity from public oversight. Second, the city should set up a citizens' committee to review potential risks, alleged economic benefits, liability for accidents, and appropriate oversight. Third, a MEPA risk and impact assessment should be conducted by people who do not have a vested interest in the laboratory. Fourth, the community must have access to investigations of accidents in other high containment laboratories. Once citizens have fairly measured the risks and benefits of BU's facility, and decided whether its location is appropriate, they can develop a risk management plan which ensures that the facility is under civilian control with strong community oversight.